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An esample for undiscounted tnultichain Markov Renewal Programming 
shows that policies may exist such that the Policy Iteration Algorithm (PM) 
can converge to these policies for some [but not all) choices of the additive 
constants in the relative values, and as a consequence that the PIX may cycle if 
the relative values are improperly determined. A class of rules for choosing the 
additive constants is given sufficient to guarantee the convergence of the PIX, as 
well as necessary and sufficient conditions for a policy to have the property that 
the PIA can converge to it for any relative value vector. Finally we give some 
properties of the policies that exhibit this foolproof convergence. 
We consider a Rlarkov Renewal Program, with R == (I,..., -V> as state space 
and K(i) as the finite set of alternatives in state i (1 < i .< N). Let 4: denote the 
one-step expected reward and Pz > 0 the transition probability to state j, 
when alternative K E K(i) is used in state i. (xj P: = 1). Finally, T:, > 0 
denotes the expected holding time, when alternative k is used in state i, given j 
is the next state of the system. A (stationary) randomizedpolicyf is characterized 
by a tableau [fiIC] satisfying fik > 0 and x kEK(jj fik = 1 for all i E Q,. where fik 
denotes the probability that the kth alternative is chosen in state i. We let SR 
indicate the set of all randomized policies and S, the subset of all pure (non- 
randomized) policies, i.e., for f~ S, each fix- = 0 or 1. For f E .S, , f(i) E K(i) 
denotes the single alternative used in state i. Associated with each ft SR are 
N-component reward vector q(f), holding time vector T(f), and two matrices 
P(f) and f4f): 
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k-K(i) kEK(i) 
(1 < i,j <N). 
Denote by n(f) the number of subchains (closed, irreducible sets of states) of 
P(f). In the system of 2N equations: 
g = P(f)& v  = 4(f) - Wf)g + P(f) =’ U-1) 
the vector g = g(f) is uniquely determined, whereas the vector v  is determined 
up to n(f) additive constants, i.e., one constant per subchain of P(f) (cf. Lemma 
2.1). A solution v  to (1.1) will be called a relative value vector and denoted by 
v(f). 
The policy iteration algorithm (PIA) for multichain Markov Renewal Pro- 
gramming is given by (cf. [2, 41): 
Step 0. Fix f” E Sp 
Step 1 (Policy Evaluation). Specify a particular solution (g, v) to the system 
(1.1) withf=fO. 
Step 2 (Policy Improvement). Define: 
b(g, v); = qik - 1 HFjgj + 2 P&v, - vi , 
j j 
ri(g) = [R E K(i) 1 K maximizes C Phgj over K E K(i)/, 
k 
D,(g, v) = {k E ri(g) 1 K maximizes b(g, v): over k E r&)}. 
Determine a new policy fi E Sp as follows: for i = l,..., N set f’(i) =f”(i) 
if f”(i) E D,(g, v) and otherwise set f’(i) equal to some arbitrary element of 
D,(g, v). I f  f1 =f”, terminate; otherwise, replace f” by f’ and go to Step 1. 
In Section 2, after introducing the notation and some preliminaries, we give 
an example showing that the PIA can cycle endlessly if the additive constants 
are chosen unwisely during the policy evaluation step. This non-convergence 
of the PIA can occur only if multichained policies exist, because, if P(f”) is 
unichained, then the relative value vector v(f”) is unique up to a multiple of 
(1, 1, l,..., 1) and as a consequence the policy f l which is the result of the policy 
improvement step does not depend upon the particular choice of v(f”). Next, 
a general procedure is given for choosing these additive constants such that PIA 
convergence is assured. 
A policy f  is said to exhibit foolproof convergence for the PIA if the PIA can 
converge to it for any relative value vector v(f ). Theorem 3.2 gives the necessary 
and sufficient condition for a policy f  to exhibit foolproof convergence, if the 
PIA can converge to it for some relative value vector v(f). Finally, Theorem 3.3 
gives some properties of policies that exhibit this foolproof convergence for the 
PIA. 
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2. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES 
For any f E SRI define the stochastic matrix II(f) as the C’esaro limit of the 
sequence {P”(f)}~zl and define the fundmtzental matrix Z(f) as [I - P(f) + 
II(f)]-‘. These matrices always exist and have the following properties (cf. 
r.1, 51): 
17(f) = P(f) n(f) = n(f) P(f) = fl(f )” = n(f) Z(f) = Z(f) U(f)> (2.1) 
v - WI -w) = Z(f) [I - ml = I- W), V.2) 
Z(f) = I+ ;z f  .V(f) - n(f )), (2.3) 
VI=1 
n(f) 
n(f )ii = C #iYf) rjvL(f )9 1 <i,j<N, (2.4) 
?tZ=l 
where n”(f) is the unique equilibrium distribution of p(f) on the mth subchain 
Cm(f), and Cim(f) is the probability of absorption in Cm(f), starting from state i 
(cf. [5, 61). Th e o f  11 owing lemma was proved in [8, Lemma 2.31: 
LEMMA 2.1 (Gain and Relative Value Vectors). Fix f  E SR . The general 
solution to the Eqs. (1.1) is gizm by 
n 6) 
with 
gi = df)i = m;l Am(f) g”(f), i = l,..., N, (2.5a) 
g”(f) = (@(f )l df)>i<~“(f ), T(f )> 
and 
r&(f) 
vi = Z(f) k?(f) - H(f) ‘Yli + c %ndi”(f ), 
WI=1 
i = l,..., N, (2.5b) 
with a, ,..., a,,u) arbitrary scalars. 
The unique solution g(f) to (1.1) equals the vector of long run average 
expected return per unit time, and will be called the gain rate vector. I f  the PIA 
converges to a policy f  *, then the pair (g, r~) satisfying (1.1) with f” replaced 
byf*v will also satisfy the functional equations 
i = l,..., N, V-6) 
vi = k~~f5j 4: - C Hbgj + 1 P$v, 1 , i = l,..., N, (2.7) j j 
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where 
L(i) = jk E K(i) 1 gi = c Pbgj m 
1 j=l 1 
The solution to (2.6) and (2.7) is not unique, although g (and hence the sets 
L(i)) is uniquely determined as the maximal gain rate vector g* (cf. e.g. [S]): 
gi* = y@f)i = gv(f)i 9 i = l,..., N, (2.8) 
R 
This shows the well-known fact that the PIA converges only to maximal gain 
policies. Accordingly define 
SPMG = {fg SP I g(f) = g*> and ‘%MG = {fE sR / g(f) = g*>. 
For any f E S, , let R(f) = {j 1 Z17(f)jj > 0} i.e., R(f) is the set of recurrent 
states for P(f), and define 
R* =: u R(f). 
fesRMG 
Finally let V = {V E EN satisfies (2.7) withg = g*}. The following lemma gives 
a characterization of R*, and was proved in Theorem 3.2 of [8]. 
LEMMA 2.2 (Characterization of R*). 
(a) R* = {i j i E R(f) for some f  E SPMG}. 
(b) The set {f E SRMG / R(f) = R*} is not empty. 
(c) DeJine n* = min{n(f) 1 f  E SR,G with R(f) = R*} and Si,, = 
{f E &MG 1 R(f) = R* andn(f) = n*}. Fix f  * E S,*,, . Any subchain of any 
fE &MG is contained within a subchain of P(f *). 
(d) Allf * E S;,, have the same collection of subchains {R*“; a = l,..., n*}. 
Next consider the following 3-state example: 
EXAMPLE 1. 
i k P,“l Pf* Pi”, q: 
1110 0 0 
2 1 0 1 0 0 
3110 0 0 
320 10 0 
Let f  z (1 = 1, 2) denote the pure policy that chooses alternative 1 in state 3. 
Examination of this example shows that the PIA will stop at f  l if and only if 
v(f ‘)z G v(f ‘)I , and will otherwise move on to f  2. Similarly the PIA will stop 
at f  a if and only if v(f 2)1 < am , and will otherwise move on to f  l. Conse- 
364 SCHWEITZER AND FEDERGRUEN 
quently the PIA will cycle endlessly between f’ and f’ if the additive constants 
for z(f’) and z(fa) are chosen unwiselv. 
Theorem 3.1 below proves that cycling of the PIA can be avoided if the 
relative value vectors in the policy evaluation part are chosen such that the 
requirement A is satisfied: 
A. for any two policies f’ and f’ that have a common subchain C and 
select identical alternatives in all states belonging to C, the relative value vectors 
I and I are chosen such that zig = am for all in C. 
This requirement is feasible since it follows from Lemma 2.1 and (2.3) that 
the relative values of the states belonging to one subchain depend only upon 
the actions selected within that subchain. The following evaluation rules satisfy 
the requirement A: 
Rule A.1 (cf. Howard [3], Denardo and Fox [2]). Set zig = 0 for the 
smallest (largest) i within each subchain of p(f). That is, choose a, = 
-z(f) [q(f) - W)g(fhn) , 111 = l,.-, n(f) where 
i(nl) = min(max) {i 1 i E Cm(f)>. 
Rule A.2 (cf. Blackwell [l]). Choose z(f) such that n(f) v(f) = 0. Using 
(l.l), v(f) then satisfies the equation 
[I- P(f) + mf)l w = 4(f) - W)g(f’) (2.9) 
and by multiplying (2.9) with Z(f), this leads to the choice: z(f) = Z(f) [q(f) 
H(f)g(f)], i.e., choose a,, = 0, m = l,..., n(f). 
3. ANTICYCLING RULES AND FOOLPROOF CONVERGENCE 
THEOREM 3.1. Suppose the choice of the relative ealues iti the evaluation part 
of the PIA satisjies the requirement A. Then the PIA must converge in a$nite number 
of steps. 
Proof. Since only finitely-many pure policies exist, assume to the contrary 
that the PIA cycles among the policies f” + f  1 + f  2 - . of’ + f  t+l = f  O. 
Since it follows from a minor modification of the proof of Lemma 4 of [2] that 
g(f O) < g(f’) < g(f’) < .” < g(f O), we obtain g(fO) =g(f') =g(f2) = ... = 
g(fO). For any f, hE SR define X(f, h) = P(h)g(f) -g(f), and IT(f, h) = 
q(h) - H(h) g(f) + P(h) u(f) - v(f). Let h be the successor off in the impro- 
vement part of the PIA. We then have: 
X(f, h) > 0; if X(f, h)i = 0 then k’(f, h)i 2 0 (1 < i d w, 
(3.1) 
if 
X(f, h)i = Y(f, h)i = 0 then h(i) =f(i) (1 < i < IV), 
(3.2) 
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The first part of (3.1) follows from Ii PFji’g(f)j >, Cj P,f,ci)g(f)$ = ,g(jJ , 
where the last equality follows from (1.1). Similarly if X(f, h& = 0, then 
mi - c W& g(fh + 1 w&j v(fb 
> AfIt - C H(f)ij i(f), + C p(f)ij @(f)i = $f)i P 
i i 
as a result of (1.1). This implies the second part of (3.1). 
Since g(fl) = g(fO) we have, using (l.l), X(fO, f’) = P(fl) g(fr) - g(fl) 
= 0, and hence as a result of (3.1): Y(f”,fl) > 0. Use (1.1) (2.1) and g(fl) = 
g(f”) to obtain: 
0 G fl(f’) Y(f07f1) = Wf’> Mf’) - f-f(fl)k!(fl) + FYfl) - 0 W’)l 
- Wf’) Nfl) - 4 W’) - 4f”)l = 0. 
Hence Y(f”, fl)i = 0 for i E R(fl), and using (3.2): f’(i) =f”(i) for i E R(fl). 
As a consequence each subchain of Z’(fl) is a subchain of P(f’J) or R(fr) C R(fO). 
Similarly we obtain: R(fO) 3_ R(fr) >_ R(f2) ... 2 R(f”) and hence R(fO) = 
R(f ‘1 = ... = R(f”) = R (say), as well as 
y(fo,fl)i = y(f’,f2)i = “’ = y(ff,fo)i =O for all i E R, 
w(f”)i = v(fl)i = ... := v(f qi for all i E 8, 
as a consequence of the requirement A. This implies, using (3.2) and the fact 
that f l # f O, the existence of at least one i. E Q - I? such that Y(f O, flJo > 0. 
Subtract the identity 0 = q(f “) - H(f “ ) g ( f  ‘) + P(f ‘) v ( f  ‘) -  v ( f  ‘) (1 = 
l,..., t + 1) from the identity Y(f I-l, f”) = q(f “)- H(f “)g(f “) + P(f “) v(f z-1) 
- v(f Z-1) (I = l,..., t + 1) and multiply the resulting equation 
Y(f I--l, f “) = [I - P(f ‘)I F(f “) - 4f ‘-‘)I 
bv Z(f ‘) in order to obtain 
zJ(f “) - v(f l-1) = Z(f “) Y(f I-l,fl), 1 = l,..., t + 1, (3.3) 
as a result of (2.2) and l7(f “) (v(f ‘) - w(f l-l)) = 0. Next use (2.3) in order to 
get: 
Tl(f “)i -  Z’(f ‘-‘)i = 2 C P(f’)yj I ’ ( f  I - l ,  f  ‘)j 3 I ’ ( f  I - l ,  f  ‘)i (3.4) 
n=O j 
and add these inequalities for I = l,..., t + 1. Note that I = z~(f~+‘), as 
a result of requirement A. We thus obtain 
t+1 t+1 
0 = 2 [ v ( f  “ )  -  t y ( f  “-“,li, 2 c Y(f ?f yi, 2 Y ( fO ,  f  ‘)i 
Z=l C-l 
which contradicts Y(fO,fl) i ,  > 0. 1 
409i6+/2-9 
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Observe that the PIA can converge to a policy f  E Sa,, , for some choice of 
the relative value vector z(f), if and only if z~(f) E L’. As a consequence, the set 
of maximal gain policies SIRI\rG can be decomposed into three subsets: First, 
there may be policies f  in Sa,,, , that make unwise decisions in some of the 
states in L’ - R(f) such that no relative value vector at all belongs to r-. or in 
other words such that the PIA can never converge to them (cf. [7, Theorem 3; 
8, Example 1 and Theorem 4.11). The second subset of S,,, consists of policies 
for which the relative value vector v(f) belongs to V, for some 6ut not all of the 
choices of the additive constants, or in other words, policies the PIA can converge 
to, but for which the convergence is not foolproof. Finally, the third subset 
contains the policies that eshibit the foolproof convergence property defined in 
Section 1, and may be empty as in Example 1. 
Note that if the PIA can converge tof for one choice of z(f), and if ~z(f) = 1, 
then policyf has foolproof convergence because z!(f) is unique up to a multiple 
of (1, 1, 1, I)..., 1). Thus the second subset must contain only multichain 
policies. Note also that in case there exists only one maximal gain policy 
f O E &MC t then f” exhibits foolproof convergence; this holds because the PIA, 
when started at f”, is unable to move on to another maximal gain policy, hence 
must converge to .f” for any choice of z(f”). 
The next theorem gives the necessary and sufficient condition for a policy f  
to exhibit foolproof convergence, given the PIA can converge to it for some 
relative value vector v(f). First define 
SL = Xj-f&i) 
THEOREM 3.2. Suppose the PIA can converge to a policy h for some relative 
value vector v(h). Then the policy h exhibits foolproof convergence ;f and only if 
II(h) == P(f) 17(h) for allf E SL . (3.5) 
Proof. First observe using (2.4) that (3.5) is equivalent to: 
W4 = P(f) #VI fort = I,..., n(h) and all f E SL . (3.6) 
I f  h exhibits foolproof convergence, then v(h) E V for all choices of the additive 
constants aI ,..., a,ch) in (2.5b). Put v* = Z(h) [p(h) - H(h)g(h)] and fix an 
integer t, with 1 < t < n(h). Then we have in particular, with the choice 
a ?n = ant, m = l,..., n(h): (cf. (2.5b), (2.7)) 
zt* + h@(h) = y&q(f) - H(f)g* + P(f) b'* + A@@))]. (3.7) 
Divide (3.7) by 1 X / and let X tend to +CC and to --co, in order to obtain 
4V) = maxf,sL P(f) 4’(h) and +(h) = maxf,sL[-P(f) +(h)], which together 
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imply (3.6) and hence (3.5). C onversely, if (3.5) and hence (3.6) holds, and if the 
PTA can converge to h for some relative value vector g(h) E V, then necessarily: 
which proves that all the relative value vectors of the policy h belong to V and 
hence that h exhibits foolproof convergence. 1 
The final theorem proves some properties of the policies that exhibit foolproof 
convergence. First, for any policy f E S, , let T”l(f) = {i E Q - R(f) 1 $im(f) = 
l’, for m = l,..., n(f), i.e., the set of transient states that get trapped in Cm(f) 
with certainty. Let p(f) = G - u:z,’ {Cm(f& P(f)} i.e., the set of transient 
states from which more than one subchain can be reached with positive pro- 
bability. Finally, let .** = minfEs, n(,f). 
THEOREM 3.3. Suppose policy f exhibits foolproof convergence, then 
(a) n(f) = .** <n*. 
(b) For each m = l,..., n**, Cnl(f) u P(j) is closed for every policy in 
S,: i E Cm(f) u T”‘(f) and k EL(~) => P& > 0 om’y ;f j E F(f) u P(f). 
(c) P(f) C R*a =P R*= C 0’(f) u F”(f), for m = l,..., n**. 
(d) P(f) has at most one subchain in each R*” (a = l,..., n*). 
(e) Let h E St , and let C be any subchain of P(h). The-n either C c Cm(f) w 
T”l(f)for some m = l,..., a** OY C C F(f). 
(f) Every poliq h E S, has at least one subchuin in each C1rf(f) u Tel(f) 
(m = l,..., n**). 
Proof. (a) First observe using (2.4) that n(h) = rank II(h), for any h E SR . 
It follows from (3.5) that n(f) := II(h) II(f) for any h E S, , hence n(f) = 
rank n(f) = rank[D(h) II(f)] < rank II(h) = n(h) which proves n(f) = 
mmAESL n(h) = n**, while n** < n* is immediate from SRMG c S, . 
(b) Recall from (3.6) that: @“(f)i = Cj PiV”(f)j, all ~EQ, K EL(i), 
m = l,..., 12* and take i E Cm(f) u T”(f) and k E L(i), to see that 1 = 
xi P$$m(f)j < 1. Thus, for all i E Cm(f) u T”(f) and K E L(i), P& > 0 only if 
Jo Cm(f) u T”‘(f) (m = l,..., n*“). 
(c) Fix .f* E S*,,, and recall from Lemma 2.2 part (d) that R*a is a 
subchain of P(f*). Take i E Cm(f) an d conclude that all states of Ran can be 
reached from i under P(f *). Since it follows from part (b) that C?(f) u T”(f) 
is closed under P(f*), this implies R*a C Cm(f) U T”(f). 
(d) Part (d) follows from part (c) since [C-l(f) u T”(f)] and [Cm’(f) u 
T”“(f)] are disjoint for m # m’. 
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(e) Each C”l(f) u T’Q) is closed for P(Iz) by part (b); hence a subchain 
of P(h) cannot include parts of two C”l(f) u T”‘(f)-sets. 
(f) Immediate from part (b). 1 
COROLLARY. Suppose II * =: 1 mid the PIA calz converge to a policy f  E S,,,, 
for some relative value vector zl(f ). Thm f  exhibits foolproof convergence $ md 
only if n(f) - 1. 
Proof. Part (a) of the theorem shows n(f) =: 1 is necessary, while the 
uniqueness of v(f) up to an additive multiple of (1, l...., 1) shows the sufficient! 
of z(f) = 1. 
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